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C00002 00002	defens[w84,jmc]		In defense of defense
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defens[w84,jmc]		In defense of defense

	It is now 38 years since the end of World War II, the last time
the U.S. had to devote its main efforts to defense.  In the meantime,
there have been numerous alarms and lesser wars.  The overall effect,
however, has been like repeated cries of "wolf".  The public, including
Congress and the academic community, has become bored and increasingly
disinclined to the expense and sacrifices required to maintain a military
establishment.  We have grown super critical, and minor annoyances with
defense requirements and minor mistakes on the part of the defense
establishment have been exaggerated into major issues, at least in
some quarters.

	All this is inevitable and has happened repeatedly in the past.
The solution that is always adopted is professionalize defense.  Some
people are paid to make it their career, and the rest of us grumblingly
pay our taxes, while the professionals grumble that we aren't paying
enough.

	Unfortunately, the problem is worse than it has been in the
past for two reasons.  The first is the existence of nuclear weapons.
I can be brief, because everyone is familiar with the fact that
our country can be damaged within hours worse than any country has suffered over
years of war.


	The second problem is the existence of the Soviet Union and of
communism.  Were it not for this, I believe the problem of nuclear
weapons would be solved by international agreement along the lines
advocated by the various peace movements.  The interaction of communist
ideology, Russian nationalism, and a pervasively quasi-feudal
empire has produced a dangerous power whose behavior is unpredictable
in the long run, even with the best intelligence.  Every succession
crisis in the Soviet Union carries with it the danger of a nuclear
Napoleon.

	In view of this, the United States and its allies require
a policy of preparedness that can be maintained indefinitely.
We must pursue such agreements as turn out to be possible with the
Soviet Union, but fundamentally we must rely on ourselves.
Unfortunately, because after World War II the U.S. was so dominant
industrially and militarily, the so-called alliance developed
a dangerous dependence on the U.S. that probably cannot be sustained.

	The academic and scientific communities have many things to
think about, and defense is only one of them.  This causes inevitable
strains in our relation with the Defense Department, whose job it is
to think about defense all the time.  Nevertheless, it's ourselves
who are being defended, and we should co-operate with them, while
maintaining our independence and our other interests.

	This view would be more readily accepted but for another
problem.  There is a substantial body of opinion in the world and
at Stanford that regards the U.S. as the villain in world affairs.
This opinion tends to convert strains in the relations between the
academic and defense communities into arguments for complete
non-co-operation.  They have achieved important successes at
Stanford, e.g. the abolition of ROTC.

	Finally, ordinary politics enters into it.  This is an
election year, and the outs tend to exaggerate their differences
with the ins and claim that Government policies, even policies
with which they have substantially agreed in Congress, are leading
the nation to an immediate disaster that can only be averted by
electing them.

	All these phenomena need to be overcome in order that Stanford
scientists and engineers can do their part in keeping the country
safe, and, incidentally, can pursue their scientific goals with
help from the Defense Department.

	JMM is correct that I view Poland and Afghanistan differently
from El Salvador, Nicaragua and Vietnam.  Let us begin with Vietnam.
At the time of our sending troops to Vietnam, our government claimed
that South Vietnam was defending itself against a Russian supported
invasion from North Vietnam, and we were helping the South Vietnamese
defend themselves.  The opponents of our intervention, of which I
was one, denied this and claimed that we were intervening against
a South Vietnamese National Liberation Front which united all opponents
of a corrupt and brutal regime.  Between 1968 and 1971 I changed my
mind, and I think that subsequent events have shown that the U.S.
Government was right in its assessment of the situation and that we
opponents were wrong.  (1) The National Liberation Front entirely
disappeared immediately after the North Vietnamese victory.  [An
interesting sidelight on Stanford attitudes is shown by a dissident
Vietnamese journalist jailed by South Vietnam and made an ASSU
visiting professor at Stanford.  After the North Vietnamese victory,
it happened that the North Vietnamese put the same journalist in
jail.  The ASSU dropped their making him a visiting professor.]

(2) Most Vietnamese were willing to give their North Vietnamese
conquerors the benefit of the doubt, especially as the American
media were influential in determining what Vietnamese thought
of their own country.  The mass attempts to escape from Vietnam
didn't begin until two years later.

Nicaragua: The attempts to overthrow the Sandinista regime are
initiated by its Nicaraguan opponents to whom the U.S. is giving
some help.  Some of them have a Somoza regime background and some
have a Sandinista background.  The opponents of this help should
say what rules they think the Russians are following and what
rules they think we should follow in view of this.  Because of
their fear of our help to the contras, the Sandinistas are making
gestures in the direction of free elections.  If they really
follow through with it and hold the elections, then we should
recognize the results.  However, we cannot abandon the contras
who depend on our aid in response to mere gestures.

El Salvador: The government there is no better than most Latin
American governments, but it did hold free elections a year or
two ago.  Unfortunately for our plans, the right wingers one.
The right wing death squads seem very bad, and we are exerting
pressure for their suppression, but left wing murder has also
been going on for years, so the left cannot be granted moral
superiority.

Chile: I don't believe we did instigate or help the coup that
overthrew Allende.  There was talk in the CIA, etc., about preventing
his taking office, but apparently nothing was done.  Nothing should
have been done.  If we did help the coup, we shouldn't have.  Allende's
term ran till 1976, and the Chileans should have waited.  Pinochet
offered the excuse that Allende was about to create an illegal
militia, i.e. not authorized by parliament, and I don't know how
to evaluate this.

	I have given a detailed discussion of the countries mentioned
by JMM and DEW, while they offered only some random charges.
Here are some more general considerations.  President Reagan referred
to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" and later as "the focus of
evil in the world".  In my opinion, the first characterization was
correct in both of its words, but the second was mistaken.  There is
not a focus of evil in the world.  Communism is an evil that would
exist without the Soviet Union and which would probably be even
stronger than it is in most of the world were it not for the unpleasant
examples the actual communist countries provide.  After all, it wasn't
the Russians who instigated the slaughter of 2 million or so Cambodians,
and the Russians weren't responsible for the cultural revolution or
the great leap forward.  There are theoretical arguments why communist
power should always lead toward a corrupt, brutal, tyrannical,
aggressive and feudal regime, but they are not very convincing.  The
actual experience of communist rule of about 20 countries has been much
more convincing.  [Each of the above five adjectives is intentional,
and if anyone doubts any of the five, I'm prepared to defend their
applicability].

	Since World War II, U.S. administrations have pursued a variety of
policies.  Some have been militantly anti-communist, and others have
tried sweetness and light.  There have been two unqualified successes in
negotiation with the Russians, the Austrian peace treaty and the treating
banning atmospheric nuclear explosions.  In general, however, sweetness
and light haven't worked.  Nixon unilaterally dismantled U.S. biological
warfare capability, and the Russians seem to have used it in
Afghanistan.  Ford tried saying that the Poles were free.  Carter tried
hugging Brezhnev and giving money to the Sandinistas.  There have
been numerous detentes and mini-detentes.  When a leader of
a capitalist country does something or says something the Russians
like, do you know how they praise him?  He is called "realistic".
Of course, most people are glad to be considered realistic and the
subject regards it as praise.  What he may fail to notice is that
this gives him absolutely no credit for any good will he may have
shown.  If he subsequently displeases the Russians, he has become
a mad dog.

	U.S. international morality isn't perfect, but it's somewhat
better than it used to be.  It is also better than that of almost
any other country, especially the Western Europeans, who want us to defend
them, but will rarely do anything much to help anyone else defend
their freedom.  They have more population and more industry than
the Soviet bloc, and yet they require the permanent presence of
300,000 American soldiers.

	Well, that was a long flame, and I hope it's my last for
a while.